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Abstract. Since the outburst of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, the people of 
the latter have widely and quite light-heartedly been depicted as refugees and it is 
no coincidence that such depictions often result in simply calling for Myanmar’s 
responsibility to protect (R2P). At a closer look though, the sole status of refugees 
is debatable and there appears to be much more than the mere R2P (ICISS 2001). 
Actually, what is happening at the Bangladesh-Burmese border is the recurrence 
of Hannah Arendt’s 1943 scenario, in which it was not possible to be simply a 
refugee. In Agamben’s words, a refugee’s temporary state of exception has to be 
resolved through either nationalization or repatriation. But how come that a 
WWII’s allegedly resolved situation still haunts us, notwithstanding even the most 
thorough legislative attempts to tackle the issue? Has the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights really brought any improvement of the matter and what might 
be its drawbacks? Is it a void tautology? This paper aims at some responses also 
by examining whether the state of exception is actually the possibility of each and 
every sovereignty (Derrida 2009). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is difficult to trace the origin of the Rohingya crisis without 
running the risk of privatising the absolute knowledge of the affair. 
As a rule, some sort of a nation-building curse always accompanies 
national pride and an endeavour aimed at disentangling not only the 
affair but what paradoxically comes first, the knowledge of it or the 
knowledge of the knowledge of it, would arguably amount to doing 
away with referentiality by inevitably referring to its always-already 
plural cause: namely, the search for an origin at the origin. On the 
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contrary, what is needed is an all-around and comprehensive 
approach as possible that remains also open rather than only ended 
and closed to revision and any further discussion. 
In this sense, to seriously face the long-lasting calamity rather 
translates into taking a look at different aspects of the present-day 
crisis: not only is the sole engagement with social dimensions 
thereof counter-productive, but at the end of the day, by means of 
a veiled reasoning, it boils down to demanding a genuine politico-
legal solution. It is this tension between the two so far outlined 
dimensions, if homogeneous at all, if only two at all, that has to be 
explored. As will be shown, current reductive requests range from 
the restoration of the citizenship status of the Rohingya to the call 
for the application of the perfectly legal responsibility to protect 
(R2P). 
As a matter of consequence, the main difficulty stemming from 
these light-hearted assumptions is that nowhere the intersection 
between social, political and legal aspects is actually even mentioned. 
This is why a different approach is needed for the debate on these 
conceivably blurring facets to be fruitful, where different does not 
mean immune without standing for the autoimmune as well, for the 
dynamic and perfectible. 
In an attempt to compensate for the widespread shortcoming in 
coping with this thorny case study, the first part of this contribution 
unpretentiously addresses precisely a general background on which 
there seems to be some kind of agreement. Needless to say, such a 
historical approach is to be considered as merely provisional and by 
no means exhaustive, if any history is such at all. Rather, its exclusive 
function should be that of pointing out at the specificity of the 
Rohingya crisis so as to fully appreciate the potential conundra at 
the intersection of the often neglected fragile borders between the 
political, the legal and the societal realms. The second part engages 
with the legal ramifications of the current situation at the Naf river 
border, whereas the fundamental importance of statelessness and its 
nexus with refugeehood are discussed in the last part. 
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A BACKGROUND PROPOSAL: THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE EXODUS  
 
Since the Second World War, Burma has arguably been home to the 
highest number of rebel groups opposing the central government. 
Even the recent Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, dated October 
15, 2015, counted only eight out of sixteen ethnic armed groups 
which accepted the truce: the ongoing tensions between the 
government and a number of ethnicities that followed, as well as the 
occasional internal frictions within both, eventually resulted into 
some groups’ exclusion. Far from the fact that such an agreement 
was a precedent and a landmark event in Myanmar’s troubled 
history, what really compounds this first framework in which the 
once colonial struggle was shaped is that the country’s ethnic groups 
are often themselves divided. This fertile ground has been exploited 
not only by the central government: even the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) made use of it whenever it was deemed useful 
for the purpose of contrasting the military’s rule and their 2008 
Constitution (Ganesan 2015, 273-4). 
It is within such a context of a fragmented and extremely 
implosive society that even an ancillary historical background of the 
Rohingya should be analysed. In spite of the sudden rise of yet 
another armed group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 
(ARSA), formerly called “Faith Movement” (Harakah al-Yakin), it 
would still be somehow reductive to treat the Rohingya issue as a 
mere matter of a recent, inter-community, radicalization (Saikia 
2017). And the same is probably true for other ethnic groups in 
Myanmar. Instead, by looking back to a variety of historical sources, 
it could be said that the Rohingya minority has notably enjoyed a 
period in which full-fledged citizenship status was uncontestedly 
and automatically assigned under the previous 1948 Citizenship Act 
(Zarni & Cowley 2014, 699). It was only in 1982, twenty years after 
the army’s coup d’état, that a new citizenship bill was adopted. 
Namely, in the aftermath of the Operation Nagamin in 1978, which 
drove one of the first waves of the Rohingya minority out of 
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Myanmar, those who remained were all of a sudden placed beyond 
the national legal framework in force and thus deprived of the 
privileges they had enjoyed until then, not appearing anymore 
among the newly-established 135 national races (“taingyintha”). 
Furthermore, by inserting a discretionary clause, the State Council 
reserved itself the power to decide upon whether and when an 
ethnic group is national or not. Such measures were apparently 
preceded by the information that many “Bengalis”, a common name 
for the Rohingya in contemporary Burma, the other, more 
offensive, being “Kalar”, benefited from the almost absent border 
control along the Naf river between Bangladesh and Myanmar and 
freely moved from one State to the other, eventually populating the 
secluded Rakhine State (Jones 2017, 52). In an attempt to curb what 
soon became perceived as illegal immigration albeit dating back to 
the colonial era, the Rohingya have ever since faced increasing 
discrimination and gradually become the “world’s most persecuted” 
(Kingston 2015, 1163-75). It is in this way that the following 
recurrent waves of violence, the major of which took place in 1992, 
2001, 2009, 2012 (Zawacki 2013, 20) and, most recently, 2017 
became the notorious milestones of the majority’s discriminatory 
practices. 
However, from both an ostensibly historical and contemporary 
perspective, thinking of the Rohingya issue as a bipolar clash 
between two fundamentally different religious identities could easily 
reveal to be excessively simplifying. Contrary to the tendency of the 
signifier Rohingya to invisibly homogenise this particular Muslim 
group on account of the idea that Rohang means Rakhine, whereas 
-ga or -gya point out at an origin and stand for “from” (Albert 2018), 
it may be proved that the two groups are not as compact as they 
may appear. The Rohingya are not even the only Muslim group 
populating Rakhine State, the Kaman being another one, itself 
theoretically eligible for citizenship as one of the taingyintha. In pretty 
much the same way, its antagonistic community is often taken as 
homogeneous as well. Yet, arguably, on both tendentiously 
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monolithic sides, critical nodes of disunity have long been there and 
are rather inflammatory. If “Arakan […] looks back to a largely 
autonomous history in Burma’s periphery” (Leider 2008, 412), then 
the tendency to blend both Muslim and Rakhine Buddhist 
population must be acknowledged. This is particularly true if one 
does include the central government in the equation, without 
necessarily or, at least, not unconditionally fusing it with the Buddhist 
residents of Rakhine State. Through such lenses, rather than there 
being a uniform religious rush to expel barbarians, what seems to be 
at stake is actually the law of the lesser evil whereby an extremely 
unstable ad hoc coalition is convened to achieve a common good in 
the short term. 
On the one hand, one of the difficulties with which the Advisory 
Commission on Rakhine State (ACRS), wanted by Aung San Suu 
Kyi and chaired by Kofi Annan, was faced is precisely that of having 
to investigate the predicament of a portion of the population not to 
be designated directly by any means. To compound the matters, the 
particular identity of the aforementioned Kaman Muslims 
populating themselves the contested Rakhine State had to be 
preserved. By using the general cognomen qua “Muslims” and “the 
Muslim community in Rakhine”, the Commission eventually 
managed to engage with the security concerns and diffused violence, 
for which it had been established in 2016 (ACRS 2016, 12). It ended 
its mandate in August 2017, concomitantly with the attacks which 
occurred on 25 August of the same year. The underlying security 
situation in the peripheral Arakan that the latter worsened could be 
proved as specific without much difficulty. For some, wider regional 
disturbances were already at work a long time ago, being precisely 
at the root of the Anglo-Burmese War in 1824 (James 2006, 120). 
Added to that is the datum stating that the Muslim population 
already present in the area could probably be traced back to at least 
the 15th century (Leider 2013, 70). Allegedly, it used to live peacefully 
and side by side with other inhabitants of the region adjacent to the 
Naf river until recently. In this sense, the contemporary hostilities 
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are actually grafted upon the long-lasting multicultural history 
characteristic of and somehow intrinsic to this Burmese territory. 
The latter has always been both in and out with regard to the core 
provinces of Myanmar. Recognising this already in the 19th century, 
the British rule constantly exploited Arakan’s vulnerability by 
obliging the residents to incessantly move. This tragic episode 
within a broader evolution of Rakhine’s communal reality became 
eventually epitomised in a single year, 1823 A.D., as enshrined in the 
aforementioned 1982 Citizenship Law. From then on, only those 
who could prove their presence prior to 1823 and the British 
colonial interference were (re)granted “first-class” citizenship. 
On the other hand, even the often blamed Buddhist majority 
appears as an undermined union, especially in today’s Rakhine (BBC 
2018). In line with the analysed existence of many state-repelling 
groups, the reasons may be, once again, historical. Similarly to the 
absence of a single and unified Muslim community par excellence in 
Burma, even on the portrayed majority side the local factor is of 
paramount importance and has been shaping the regional dynamics 
for a long time now. For instance, Buddha’s teaching, also known 
as sasana, the Mahamuni statue and the status of Mrauk U in 
northern Rakhine State have compounded the process of 
unification between Rakhine Buddhists and the Bamar since 
Burma’s independence in 1948 (Leider 2008, 413-9). 
Having said that, the uncontested diacritical sign of the most 
recent exodus remains, however, the statelessness status to which the 
Rohingya minority has been compelled since 1982. Its implications 
will be further elaborated upon, especially in relation to the hitherto 
advanced initiatives on how to tackle the crisis. The following 
bottom line will then hopefully emerge: the tendency to take 
statelessness as simply wrong and for granted, to see it as a Danaian 
gift to be refused without even being inspected and to ignore it as 
precisely one of the products of the solutions which will soon be 
illustrated. 
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LEGAL APORIAS: THE IMPERVIOUSNESS OF SOLUTIONS 
 
The latest wave of violence which followed ARSA’s August 25, 2017 
attacks against border posts with Bangladesh engendered a mass 
departure of at least 624,000 people (ICG 2017) from Myanmar. 
They headed mainly towards the preexisting Kutupalong camp in 
the proximity of Cox’s Bazar but did not completely disregard other 
options, such as Thailand. No matter where they escaped, by the 
existing international legal framework they could have by no means 
become refugees without the hosting governments’ consent. As 
their main destination, Bangladesh, is not a party to the 1951 
Refugee Convention, nor to its 1967 Protocol, it is de facto 
governments’ bona fide attitude towards UN Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) a condition sine qua non for a successful management of 
this kind of calamities. Indeed, notwithstanding even the reach of 
art. 31 of Bangladesh’s Constitution and the fundamental rights 
thereby indiscriminately guaranteed, the particularity of the region, 
as a veritable black hole of international law, easily comes to the 
fore. Today, this can be noted from a recent agreement between 
Bangladesh and UNHCR on the voluntary repatriation plan, namely 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), to be implemented as soon 
as conditions in Myanmar allow so (UNHCR 2018a). At almost two 
months from the failure of the previous Bangladeshi-Burmese 
“private” deal (The Independent 2018), it can be seen a step 
forward, but it simultaneously shows how delicate the dialogue must 
be and how fragile the solutions are. For the sake of clarity, the 
previous bilateral attempt failed in January precisely on account of 
the absence of satisfying conditions in Myanmar. But, why are there 
few alternatives to that and why is the underlying message still the 
same today, after so many failures? Namely, the impression is that 
repatriation could be voluntary or involuntary, but it must occur. For 
this reason, Myanmar’s key stance on the issue was fortunately not 
left out as UNHCR and UNDP drafted a separate MoU with Nay 
Pyi Taw shortly after Bangladesh signed its own (UNHCR 2018b). 
Igor Milić - Rohingya as Homines Sacri: The Statelessness Conundrum 
88 
Obviously, the first proposal of these lines is not to superfluously 
outline the difference between the institutionalized and improvised 
consent of a government to a convention and a memorandum, 
respectively between a fully integrated human rights-based country 
and those who are more recalcitrant towards pooled sovereignty, 
and not even to criticise by envisaging a perfectly workable 
pharmakon in the background. Rather, the aim is precisely to go 
beyond and cope with the development of the institution of the 
refugee status which brought us to this tortuous case study. In other 
words, the problem tackled here is not a specific modus operandi, but 
the very necessity of any modus operandi in presence of refugeehood 
whereby it forcefully becomes an interim safety net. 
However, a vehicular pattern of behaviour will not be omitted 
and it can be effortlessly observed: even the previous solutions to 
Rohingya’s exoduses followed the above and current model with 
some minor differences. These eventually affected the group’s 
voluntariness, especially once the return in 1978 did not really 
change the apparently conciliatory attitude of the Tatmadaw. In 
1978, UNHCR assisted the process of voluntary return without 
Dhaka’s approval (Leider 2013, 71), whereas in 1992 the operation 
was carried out in direct coordination with the government of 
Bangladesh (Parnini 2012, 287-8). Even by just scratching the 
surface, it can finally be appreciated how deeply embedded is the 
idea that the arguably human figure by itself, the refugee is to be 
monitored through what has calcified and stratified as a transition, 
a void, an unpleasant situation or moment and as a nightmare. 
Moving towards a detailed analysis thus requires us to discern the 
common element of all international community’s responses so far. 
Far from the latter being voluntarily malevolent, it must be said that 
the temporariness of the refugee status qua de facto avoidance of and a 
disregard for nude humanity has long been unaddressed. A refugee 
is not simply  
 
any person who […] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
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or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it 
 
but also, quite conceivably, he who, being caught in an exceptional 
situation, has to be either repatriated or nationalised so as to (continue 
to) fully enjoy their human rights. The Rohingya undoubtedly fall 
within the last part of the above definition just by means of an ad 
hoc expression of tenuous political will, namely Bangladesh’s 
cooperative stance. Therefore, the sense of the underlying and 
tempting statement that no Rohingya is merely a refugee is not 
anyhow intended to deny them humanitarian relief. Quite on the 
contrary, it recognises something unheimlich and uncanny in them 
being refugees without being proper refugees. Hence, a Rohingya is 
both a refugee and the negation of pure refugeehood, even before 
taking for granted their former status and guiding them towards the 
Eden of citizenship. 
To sum up, national politico-legal systems and, as it will be 
shown, the ostensibly supplementary and disciplinary international 
institutionalism simply leave no room for the refugee in the capacity 
of the human as such (Agamben 2008, 90-5). As Arendt put it: “We 
actually live in a world where human beings as such have ceased to 
exist for a while” (Arendt 1978, 65). It can now be claimed that 
nowhere does this Second World War scenario appear with more 
clarity than in our contemporary world, even though it has so far 
been largely neglected on account of its alleged resolution with the 
arrival of the age of rights. For instance, through the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which it is high time to 
examine differently. 
 
STATELESSNESS, RUFUGEEHOOD AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
If it can be assumed that a stateless person shall be the first and 
immediate personification of article 1 of UDHR, since “all people 
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are born free and equal in dignity and rights [...]”, an important 
aporia arises with the birth of the 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, the former of which states as follows: 
“[…] the term ‘stateless person’ means a person who is not 
considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law”. 
For, in the first of the two legal documents, it is the basic act of 
factual birth which entitles to freedom, decent and rightful life, 
whereas with the second it becomes clear that a further step is 
needed: the birth within a specific national legal context, which, 
most importantly, accepts to recognise, attest and certify the 
apparently self-sufficient factual events. The latter Convention even 
pledges to reduce and eventually end statelessness. What is more, on 
the basis of the previous analysis of the Rohingya exodus, the 
UDHR appears contradictory by itself: namely, articles 1 and 15 
arguably clash in that no human being is actually a bearer of “first-
class” rights unless a citizen of a State. If being born entitles to a set 
of rights which, in turn, entitled to the right to citizenship, then this 
stratification of rights cannot anymore be taken for granted without 
exploring its fundamental drawbacks, its raison d’être. In other words, 
the “constitutional dilemma” (Zucca 2008, 20), that which cannot 
be pinned down here and now, is that one is either a holder of a set 
of rights by the act of mere physical birth independently of all 
circumstances or one has such entitlement as long as they possess a 
citizenship, the so-called “right to have rights”: 
 
Citizenship is man’s basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to have rights. Remove this 
priceless possession and there remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of 
his countrymen. He has no lawful claim to protection from any nation, and no nation may assert 
rights on his behalf (Perez v. Brownell 356 U.S. 44). 
 
Even in this statement, as is clear, little effort is made towards 
thinking statelessness in terms of bare humanness: rather, a stateless 
person is “disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen”, 
as though their personhood lacked something essential on account 
of the sole absence of an identification document. Without 
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anarchical claims, as should be apparent so far, and with respect 
towards the above pragmatic way of reasoning, the most impactful 
and simple way of expressing such a paradox is probably the 
following: at the end of the day, the subject of full-fledged human 
rights may turn out to be the figure of a citizen. 
Yet, reflecting upon what has been said so far, a scenario of 
systematic deprivation of rights in Myanmar has been possible not 
because there was a formal Ausnahmezustand, i. e. “state of exception” 
(Agamben 2005, 4), but because State order always-already relies on 
a state of exception. It is so even when a State merely decides (lat. 
de-caedere), that is, even when, in Schmittean terms, the State does 
not necessarily decide on the exception in a conscious manner 
(Schmitt 2005, 5). As a matter of consequence, an intrinsically rogue 
State a priori undermines the supplementarity of any constitutional 
act which would be superfluously vehicular and unnecessary in 
relation to an allegedly accomplished sense - the rogueness in this 
case. Rather, the supreme law of a State qua Constitution is itself 
more of a tool to manage uncertainty, the fugitive degrees of 
uncertainty, to bet and offer a “constitution of risk” (Vermeule 
2013, 1-51). Hence, there does not even need to be a state of 
emergency to generate a state of exception, the ultimate message 
being that a law is by itself a state of exception which appears as 
normality and simultaneously by no means as justice: 
 
Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that 
there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the 
incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as improbable as 
they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision 
between just and unjust is never insured by a rule (Derrida 1992, 16). 
 
By being placed outside of the legal order by a rule, a law, an 
everyday legislative procedure, the Rohingya immediately turned 
into homines sacri (sacred men), “[...] who may be killed and yet not 
sacrificed [...] included in the judicial order [ordinamento] solely in the 
form of [...] exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed)” (Agamben 
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1995, 8). It is important to remark that to be sacer translates into 
being both sacred and holy as well as cursed and doomed. Hence, a 
homo sacer becomes or can become an outlaw through the law, a 
subjectivity deprived of zoe, the latter standing for political or 
community life. Its existence is always declined as half-done, 
suspended but not unviable, hindered but not unfree, rather than 
something which simply is. 
Rancière comes up with yet another hermeneutical possibility: we 
have so far seen that human rights can be intended as the rights of 
a citizen as well as the almost useless rights of those with no rights. 
What is at the basis of this bipolarisation of the discourse according 
to him is precisely a way of thinking intended to surgically separate 
the private from the public realm and conceptualise politics even 
though it is precisely that which indefinitely escapes all definite 
conceptualisation. For, politics is exactly the infinitely finite, the 
incalculable part of those with no part at all, who, paradoxically, 
exercise the rights they do not have. Similarly, there are the 
unpredictable difficulties of those with a part, namely citizens, who, 
in turn, do not exercise the rights they have (Rancière 2010, 70). As 
a matter of fact, the sense of recognition espouses before all the idea 
that the recognised is always already a matter of debate and barely 
anything in itself: there is no signified which is not spoilt by a 
signifier and the other way around, there is no signified which is not 
a signifier, which cannot help but open up the question of the 
border. Human rights as rights of the citizen and the rights of the 
stateless are not then necessary to be seen as mutually exclusive, 
quite on the contrary. In this way, the previously hermetic categories 
become rather dynamic and the boundaries between them eternally 
blurred: human rights sign a great development, but not without the 
risk of being simultaneously completely void. This triggering 
paradox and empowering aporia engenders the demos for Rancière, 
the ameboid organ which stands silently at the basis of politics as a 
never-ending process rather than an accomplished state of affairs. 
Seen against this background, UDHR protects both the stateless and 
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the first-class, full and accomplished citizens, but not necessarily by 
placing them at two different levels. 
This can probably be most properly observed with yet another 
instrument of the international community which appears to be 
impotent towards these challenges, namely, the responsibility to 
protect (R2P). Envisaged in the new millennium as a legal successor 
of the intrusive and controversially illegal humanitarian intervention 
(ICISS 2001), the same aporia within it was immediately and 
unconsciously reproduced. As a matter of fact, it is not clear at all 
whether a State and, jointly or alternatively, the international 
community have the responsibility to protect citizens or populations 
(ICISS 2001, VIII, XI, 13, 15, 16, 19, 39, 40, 49, 75; Bellamy 2009, 
76; SG/SM/8125 2002; A/61/677 2009, 8). Certainly, the first two 
conclusions are self-sufficient: indeed, it is either about citizens or 
about populations. But, in a strange fashion, what is easily not 
accounted for is precisely the demos as the people, both an allegedly 
empowered political body and potentially a mass of those deprived 
of their rights. Consequently, the demos, the people, actually fuse the 
two apparently irreconcilable concepts of citizens and populations. The 
responsibility to protect belongs thus to those who claim the right 
and the entitlement to it on the basis of a set of initially void and 
unenforceable rights, especially when they have no legal entitlement 
to claim so. It is this oblivion and excess, supplement and surplus 
which is at the basis of the age of rights, which makes rights 
enactable rather than enacted, which signs the beginning of the age 
of rights before its solemn beginning. 
In conclusion, one practical, biopolitical warning of the above 
apparently negligible divide remains a blatant illustration of politics 
as a process. Consider article 348 of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution: 
“The Union shall not discriminate any citizen of [...] Myanmar, based 
on race, birth, religion, official position, status, sex and wealth”. For, 
the Rohingya having been stateless since 1982, this would imply no 
particular Burmese responsibility at all towards a population rendered 
stateless in a scarce human rights enforcement era. Or, at least, 
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hardly any major responsibility of any other State turning, out of 
personal goodwill, to those caught in the vacuum constitutive of any 
order itself. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To sum up, it can now be fully appreciated how unstable and 
challengeable our international provisions are. They are so to the 
extent that thinking of other instantly actionable, precise, clear-cut 
and shorter rules and norms would be for nothing if the idea of 
transcending the hitherto known (inter)national legal order were not 
itself transcended. In this sense, no rule will ever be justice, which is 
precisely why the unpretentious rethinking of the existing rules is 
always a good start. They will always draw their spiritus movens from 
the Otherness, which is nothing more than the haunting hint of the 
inherent fragility of any rule as such. 
It is in this sense that the somehow necessary post-WWII 
empowerment of the human in a certain sense brought us full circle 
to where it all began. In a homoeopathic manner, the proposed 
solution is nothing more than the diluted cause starting from which 
the whole Hobbesian political order was engendered, namely, how 
is homo different from the contemporary figure of the human? 
Answering to this question would hardly solve the following 
leitmotif: the empowerment of the human is not simply the progress 
of sovereignty without being the landmark of the imperfection of 
the concept of sovereignty itself (Derrida, 2005, 87-8). 
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